The development potential of migration: the status quo, lessons from other regions, and implications for research by Naudé, Wim et al.
  
WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA OFFICE                      THEMATIC RESEARCH NOTES 04 • APRIL 2013 
The development potential of migration 





Alan de Brauw 
Robert E.B. Lucas 
Flore Gubert 
Fleur Wouterse 
Hein de Haas 
 
Migration may be triggered by one or more factors including economic issues such as 
relative economic stagnation or decline, environmental fluctuations that would include 
climate change and negative changes in weather conditions, political volatility, and social 
concerns for example, conflicts and other forms of social instability.    
This issue of the Thematic Research Notes discusses the causes and impact of 
migration among communities in Africa as well as predicted future migration trends. 
Historically, economic and social factors, in particular, differences in GDP growth and 
armed conflict,  have had the greatest impact on migratory flows (Naudé). The role of 
environmental factors, such as anomalies in temperature and rainfalls, and how they affect 
the land and subsequent decisions to migrate from rural areas to urban centers and across 
national borders, is examined by Maystadt.  
Independent of its root causes, migration has strong implications for both 
communities of origin and destination. Where it is a response to rural pressures, migration 
can either alleviate or aggravate such stresses. The outcome depends on whether it 
hinders access to labor and investment resources or plays a role of assurance among rural 
areas of origin, together with related implications for technology adoption and changes in 
rural wages (de Brauw; Gubert). Furthermore, there are indications that migration 
destination (continental or international) affects certain economic activities and that there 
is an ultimate impact on the rural economy (Wouterse). At the macroeconomic level, the 
issue of brain drain vs. brain gain is often mentioned in discussions of the cost and benefits 
of migration (Lucas). 
The findings presented in this issue include some surprises: Net migration from 
Africa, excluding North Africa, has been the lowest among all developing regions and has 
not changed since 2005; economic improvement and increased political stability are likely 
to further slowdown and perhaps even reverse migration, turning Africa into a net 
destination; most future environment induced migration is likely to be intra-African 
between coastal and inland countries, with flows in both direction, driven by regional 
differences.  
In sum, whether continental or intercontinental, driven by environmental, 
economic, or social factors, migration is a long term phenomenon that needs to be better 
understood and managed. This issue is a contribution to the debate that needs to take 
place. 
Ousmane Badiane, Director for Africa, IFPRI 
 
 
 UNDERSTANDING MIGRATION TO AND FROM 
AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 
Wim Naudé 
 
Emigrants from Africa south of the Sahara have made significant large contributions to human civilization and 
development. Much of the earliest out-migration from Africa was driven by environmental pressures and opportunities, 
such as seasonal variations in weather and climate change.  
Recent migration might be the result of conflict in Africa countries south of the Sahara, implying that much of 
Africa’s migration is “forced.” This type of migration leads to destruction of physical capital as well as displacement of 
human capital.   During the 1980s, the continent experienced a rising trend in civil wars with particularly protracted 
conflicts in Angola, DRC, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia and Sudan. As a result Africa today is one of the continents with 
the largest numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons – about 1 out of 3 refugees worldwide are in Africa. 
These conflicts, together with decades of economic stagnation, and increasing environmental pressures, have led to a 
brain drain from the continent:  more than 23,000 university graduates and 50,000 executives emigrate from Africa 
annually and there were around 135,000 African born health sector professionals working in developed countries in 
2000. 
While this brain drain is not unexpected in light of the conflict and economic situation many African countries 
have been faced with, official rates of out-migration from Africa south of the Sahara  have been surprising low when 
compared to other regions.  Figure 1 depicts the rates of net migration (immigration minus emigration) in various world 
regions between 2000 and 2010.  It shows that over this recent period that net migration was lowest in the case of 
Africa south of the Sahara – out-migration from South Asia, Latin America, and East Asia were much higher. Moreover, 
immigration tended to occur into Europe and Central Asia, and North America. Net migration was low in Africa south of 
the Sahara and more stable compared to other regions with little change between 2005 and 2010. This may just be a 
temporary reflection of a period of good growth for Africa due to commodity booms, rising foreign investment, decline 
in many (but not all) conflicts, and a period, at least since the 2008 crisis in the West, during which the attractiveness of 
migration to Europe has started to wane as jobs have become scarcer and entry more difficult.  
 
Figure 1 - Net Migration, 2000 – 2010 
 








































 Despite these low rates of net migration from Africa, some have warned "African emigration pressure is building 
up dramatically” (Hatton and Williamson 2001). To understand whether there is substance to this warning and whether 
Africa south of the Sahara will continue to suffer from net out-migration and the brain drain in the future, it is crucial to 
better understand the determinants of migration from the continent, limited until fairly recently by a lack of quantitative 
studies. One recent attempt to rectify this is by Naudé (2010), using data (made available by the UN Population Division) 
on net migration for 45 African countries for 10 five-year periods, from 1960 to 2005, and employing a dynamic panel 
data estimator, found that, in broad terms, armed conflict and differences in GDP growth have the greatest impact on 
international migration from Africa. An additional period of conflict will raise emigration by 1.7 per 1,000 inhabitants, 
while 1 percent GDP growth will reduce emigration by 1.5 per 1,000. Hence, international migration from Africa remains, 
as in the past, largely forced in nature.  
The roles of natural hazards and more gradual environmental degradation, and pressure on natural resources 
are more difficult to discern, despite the claim by many that environmentally forced migration is significant in Africa. 
Statistical analyses show no direct evidence that environmentally forced migration is significant at the macro-level. 
Tentative evidence, however, suggests that natural disasters may act as a trigger for conflict in Africa, so that 
environmental factors may indirectly drive international migration. Further research is needed in this regard. With 
prospects of peace and economic development recently improving in Africa, the fears of an increased out-migration 
from Africa seem difficult to sustain. Given its huge natural resource endowments, tourism potential, and improved 
macroeconomic governance, a reduction in conflicts could significantly reduce out-migration. Moreover, greater stability 
and a strengthening of institutions could, and should make Africa more desirable as a destination for highly skilled 





 THE IMPACT OF WEATHER ANOMALIES ON 
MIGRATION IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 
 Jean-Francois Maystadt  
 
Weather shocks can be roughly hypothesized to have two effects on migration. First, countries strongly dependent on 
the agricultural sector will experience a fall in rural wages in the case of sustained negative weather changes. This brings 
forth incentives for rural–urban migration. At the same time, a direct (amenity) effect, which is related to the possible 
spread of disease or a higher probability of death from flooding or excessive heat waves, induces incentives for urban–
international migration. Second, the inflow of agricultural workers into the urban sector pushes urban wages down and 
gives further (economic) incentives for urban–international migration. The inflow of environmental migrants reduces 
average wages in the foreign country, and the economy moves back into a new equilibrium, where we now can see 
increasing urbanization in a country that has experienced worsening weather conditions and falling rural population, 
due to lower total population resulting from international migration.  
Results from a cross-country panel of countries in Africa south of the Sahara (henceforth referred to as Africa), 
through a system of equations confirm the existence of both direct (amenity) and indirect (economic incentives and 
urbanization changes) effects of weather anomalies on international migration.  
 
Table 1 – Direct and indirect effects of weather anomalies on international migration 
Regressions (1) First-stage (2) First-stage (3) Second-stage 
Models Fixed effects two-stage least squares 
Dependent variable GDP ratio Urbanization Net migration rate 
Rainfall anomalies -0.023 -0.003 0.843 
Temperature anomalies -0.043*** -0.020** 2.841** 
Rainfall anomalies*agricultural dependence 0.049*** 0.002 -1.258 
Temperature anomalies*agricultural dependence 0.008 0.045*** -4.253** 
Log (GDP pc/GDP pact)   21.58*** 
Log (Urbanization)   67.51*** 
Observations 750 750 750 
Number of countries 39 39 39 
Source: Author Calculations. 
Notes: **significant at 1 percent, GDP ratio is measured as the logarithmic transformation of the ratio of per capita domestic GDP pc and GDP per 
capita in neighboring countries. Weather anomalies are computed as deviations of annual rainfall and temperature from the country’s long-term 
mean (defined between 1901 and 2000), divided by its long-run standard deviation. Country-fixed effects, time and regional-time dummies as well 
as other control variables are included in the regressions.  
 
African countries that have a large agricultural sector appear to be particularly vulnerable. Weather anomalies increase 
the economic incentives to migrate out of one’s country of origin and strengthen the urbanization process especially in 
agricultural dependent countries (positive effects of the relative GDP per capita and the level of urbanization). 
Temperature anomalies in general and rainfall anomalies in agricultural dependent countries respectively decrease and 
increase GDP per capita and in turn, increase the incentives to out-migrate (see columns 1 and 3 in Table 1). 
 Temperature anomalies also strengthen the urbanization process in agriculturally-dominated countries. Given the 
productivity gains associated with urban concentration, increased urbanization softens the impact of weather anomalies 
on international migration. Overall, these results suggest that weather anomalies raise the incentives to migrate to 
another country.  
Although until now, the phenomenon of environmental migration in Africa appears to be limited to an 
estimated net number of 128,000 migrants per year over the period 1960–2000, which represents 0.3 percent of the 
population, in the future this phenomenon may magnify. Estimates of the impact of weather anomalies on the future 
rate of migration in Africa, using the climate projections described in the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the United 
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), show that an additional 0.121 to 0.532 percent of the 
African population will be induced to migrate annually due to varying weather conditions toward the end of the 21st 
century. Applying these future migration rates to UN projections of population changes yields, in net terms, a figure of 
an additional 2.9 million environmental migrants every year for the period 2080-2099 compared to the period 1980-
1999 in the low-fertility/best-weather-change scenario. The results are an additional 25 million migrants in the high-
fertility/worse-weather-change scenario. Under moderate scenarios, in terms of both climate and population changes, 
future weather anomalies could lead to an additional displacement of 5 to 24 million people every year by the end of 
the 21st century. While there has been a long tradition of migration to the coastal areas in Africa, these locations could 
experience a significant proportion of their population fleeing toward the African mainland due to weather changes by 
2099 (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 – Projected net environmental migrants per thousand of population 2000-2099 
 
Source: Marchiori, Maystadt, and Schumacher (2012) 
In Western Africa, the most affected countries include Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone; 
in Eastern Africa, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda; in Southern Africa, Angola and Botswana; 
and in Central Africa, Congo and Gabon. 
 These results impose serious and challenging questions for policy makers. African countries only account for 
approximately five percent of world emissions and if one believes the academic literature and the works of the IPCC in 
that weather anomalies may be human-induced, these variations are nearly exclusively driven by the developed world. 
This externality thus imposed on African countries requires international attention based on equity and fairness criteria. 
In this respect, the recent advances presented in the Cancun Agreement provide a good starting point. However, one of 
the important components of the Cancun Agreement, namely Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions, will not be a 
useful policy tool for Africa due to the relatively low total emissions. Future policies should therefore focus more closely 
on adaptation policies, for example by making crops less sensitive to weather anomalies.   
 POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF MIGRATION ON PRODUCTION 
IN RURAL AREAS 
Alan de Brauw 
 
Since the seminal contribution of Lewis (1954), migration of labor out of agriculture has become considered a primary 
feature of the economic development process (see De Haan (1999) and Taylor and Martin (2001) for a review of the 
literature). However, the potential effects of migration on agricultural and other rural production activities can be quite 
complex. Migrants typically continue to have economic interactions with the source households and communities they 
leave behind (Stark and Bloom 1985), and these interactions are particularly important when markets do not function 
well.  Therefore, migration may have direct effects on agricultural production in source communities.  If rural markets 
are well functioning, the effects of migration on agricultural production should be minimal. Households that send out 
migrants would be able to hire labor to substitute for the labor that migrants would have provided on the farm, and if 
necessary households could borrow money for inputs prior to production. However, if land, labor, or credit markets in 
rural areas are incomplete, migration could have either positive or negative effects on household production. For 
example, if households cannot substitute for migrant labor, the loss of that labor could cause agricultural production to 
decrease. Alternatively, households might use less labor-intensive technologies, or they might substitute land-intensive 
for labor-intensive crops. If households lack access to liquidity or credit, migrant remittances may help relax other 
constraints on agricultural production; as a result, household production or productivity may rise with migration. 
Therefore, the possible effects of migration on agricultural production are theoretically indeterminate and likely depend 
upon constraints and the relative values of specific inputs. 
 To illustrate more fully, consider that a household has fixed resources which it can invest in either a low-
productivity or high-productivity technology to produce a given good.  Assume further that at prevailing relative prices, 
the household would specialize in the high productivity technology, which simply means that the household would 
invest all of its resources in the high productivity technology.  Consider, however, that the household faces one of 
several different potential constraints on investing in the high productivity technology such as credit or liquidity 
constraint, or high risk intolerance.  In any of these cases, the constraints would induce the household to produce a 
lower amount of the good using the high productivity technology and more of it using the low productivity technology. 
Overall productivity and profits would consequently be lower than they would be if the household was not constrained 
at all.   
Now, if the household chooses to send out a migrant or migrants, there are potentially competing effects on 
production.  Migration could tighten the constraint by reducing the available labor for investing in the high productivity 
technology. On the other hand, migrant remittances could relax the constraint either by providing liquidity to the 
household or by being willing to remit in case of an agricultural shock or otherwise induced production related loss of 
income, thus raising the level of risk tolerance.  In general, the overall impact of migration on agricultural production or 
productivity is therefore indeterminate, and the direction of the impact becomes an empirical question. Where this 
question has been studied, results vary significantly by context. Rozelle, Taylor, and de Brauw (1999) find a negative 
correlation of migration with maize yields in northern China, but they find a positive correlation with remittances. De 
Brauw (2010) finds a net positive impact of migration and remittances on agricultural production in general in Vietnam.  
Damon (2010), on the other hand, finds that households in El Salvador use migrant remittances as a main income source 
and move from high value production to subsistence crops.  Similarly, Miluka et al. (2010) find that households in 
Albania use migration as a vehicle to leave agriculture entirely. For Africa, Wouterse and Taylor (2008) find that inter-
continental migration, which tends to be long-term and generates significantly larger remittances, stimulates livestock 
production while being negatively associated with more labor-intensive activities - subsistence cropping and nonfarm 
employment. 
  
 MIGRATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 
Robert EB Lucas 
 
The effects of migration on economic development in countries of origin vary from context to context. Much depends 
on the nature and composition of migration, the economic environment in the sending countries (or countries of origin), 
and the experience of migrants while away. Largely, effects of migration on source economies may be categorized 
according to the level of remittances, the skill level of the migrant and the duration of migration. 
The combination of income and foreign exchange availability, poverty relief, and external financing is directing a 
great deal of attention toward remittances and how they can be encouraged. The effects of remittance receipts on 
domestic macroeconomic performance, however, remain a subject of debate. The potential effects are well known and 
mixed. On the positive side are expanded savings and investment, plus the multiplier stimulus effects from added 
spending. On the negative side is the potential for diminished labor supply and effort induced by higher transfers, 
together with a Dutch disease–like effect or pressure on domestic currencies in sending countries towards 
overvaluation, which discourages the production of tradable goods and slows down growth. The more tenable analyses 
tend to indicate a positive effect of remittances on overall investment levels or a significant expansionary effect from 
remittance spending.  
The brain drain issue centers not on whether the departure of highly skilled or particularly bright people lowers 
domestic production but on whether those who remain at home are damaged by these departures, given that the elite 
emigrants are no longer paid locally. There are two quite distinct aspects to this potential cost imposed on others. First, 
the hypothetical notion that the presence of highly skilled people confers an external, uncompensated benefit on 
others; departure of this elite thus imposes loss of these externalities on those who remain at home. Measuring external 
benefits is extraordinarily difficult. We do not possess enough evidence of large positive externalities from education 
that emigration of the highly educated should be universally decried on these grounds. Second is the loss of public 
spending on the education of departing migrants and, more generally, the fiscal costs resulting from a brain drain. The 
per student cost of tertiary education is far higher than the costs of primary or secondary education. Moreover, relative 
to income, the cost of tertiary education is highest in the lower-income countries, where these costs are heavily 
subsidized. At the point of emigrant departure, these costs have already been incurred and cannot be recovered. 
Nonetheless, the home state normally loses the taxes that the educated migrant would have paid in the home country. 
On the saving side, reductions in discretionary state spending on the migrant, and perhaps the migrant’s dependents, 
need to be weighed, as should any tax revenues derived directly or indirectly as a result of remittances. 
At least four components of a potential brain gain can be emphasized. The first three refer to the influence of 
the diaspora, particularly the skilled members of the diaspora, in promoting trade, international capital flows, and 
technology transfers to the home country. A growing body of evidence indicates that migrant stocks, and especially the 
more highly skilled diaspora, can play a significant role in promoting international trade. There are also instances in 
which a diaspora undertakes major investments in the home country, perhaps especially where such investments are 
welcomed and actively encouraged and where the returns are high. It remains unclear, however, whether or not such 
instances are common.  For technology transfer, it remains unclear whether the lowest income countries can take 
advantage of the latest technologies from the developed nations, even if transmitted by their educated nationals from 
overseas. The fourth element refers to the possibility that a brain drain can induce educational expansion among 
remaining nationals. The notion is that private returns to education are raised by the potential to emigrate, inducing 
additional investment in education, yet only a portion of the additional educated population will actually emigrate. 
The flow of migrants with temporary status has expanded fairly universally in recent years. Temporary Migrant 
Programs (TMPs) exhibit a mix of advantages and disadvantages for both the host and sending countries. In particular, 
three concerns about the permanence of TMPs arise. One is the turnover among migrants. Rapid turnover of the stock 
of employees can impose significant costs on employers. Another significant cost is in situations where specific training 
for the employee is critical and a less tangible cost is trust placed in employees by the employers.  In some situations this 
is compensated by lower labor costs, either because of lower wages or limited benefit contributions, for temporary 
migrant workers. From the perspective of the sending countries, return migration has several attractions though some 
costs are also attached. The principal argument in favor of temporary migration is the greater likelihood of contact with 
the home area by migrants who intend to return—and therefore the tendency to remit more and perhaps to contribute 
in other ways as active members of a diaspora. A second purported advantage is that workers return with freshly 
 acquired skills, or at least enriching experiences, although here the evidence is mixed. Migrants may not re-enter work 
immediately on return and periods of non-employment or open unemployment can be prolonged, supported by 
accumulated savings and perhaps fueled by unrealistic earnings aspirations. A third advantage is whether the TMP itself 
proves temporary in the face of shocks to the host country. In principle, where turnover rates are high among migrant 
workers, it becomes easier for host states to reduce the stock of migrant workers, imposing adjustment costs on migrant 
sending nations in the wake of economic shocks or crises. The fourth is whether the TMP proves capable of reduction in 
the long term. Not all of the demands for less-skilled workers in the high-income countries exist merely  because of prior 
legal or undocumented migration. The future of temporary migration by lower-skilled workers from = developing 
countries will depend on the outcome of these demands. Where outputs are tradable, protection in the high-income 
countries, especially related to agricultural subsidies and outsourcing must be analyzed. Some services, however, benefit 
from the use of  low-skilled workers and are more difficult to shift offshore. Unless labor-saving technologies enable 
firms to dispense with low-skilled workers in these service sectors, the demand for temporary migrant workers is likely 
to prove permanent. 
 
  
 MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT: MIXED 
EVIDENCE FROM WESTERN MALI  
Flore Gubert 
 
Migration has manifold and sometimes contradictory effects on sending countries. On one hand, emigration may help to 
reduce tension on the sending country’s labor market and give rise to wide-ranging financial transfers. On the other 
hand, by favoring skilled workers, it may lead to brain drain, thus slowing down development and making countries 
dependent on the funds they receive from their migrants. Highly involved in long distance migration to Europe and 
particularly France since the early 1960s, the Kayes area located in Western Mali provides a particularly interesting case 
study. According to recent survey data, 43.7 percent of the region's inhabitants live in remittances-recipient households.  
 



















Kayes 1,202 83.0 6.46 0.53 1.32 1.73 2.27 0.62 64,176.3 
Koulikoro 1,303 37.4 2.65 0.76 0.11 0.71 0.61 0.46 17,876.7 
Sikasso 1,488 73.0 4.68 3.67 0.37 0.50 0.08 0.06 11,877.3 
Segou 1,298 32.7 2.46 0.96 0.27 0.61 0.27 0.35 22,241 
Mopti 1,175 41.7 3.42 1.86 0.45 0.61 0.03 0.48 9,424.4 
TGK(**) 846 23.0 2.64 0.82 1.43 0.34 0.02 0.05 6,619.7 
Bamako 1,257 23.3 1.82 0.41 0.13 0.43 0.67 0.19 13,811.3 
Mali 8,639 314.1 3.51 1.37 0.53 0.72 0.58 0.32 146,026.7 
Source: INSTAT-DIAL.  
Note: (*) Figures computed on individuals aged 15 or more. (**) Timbuktu-Gao-Kidal. 
 
Given the share of total gross income coming from abroad for those households, it would be impossible for many of 
them to satisfy their basic needs in the short-run if remittances were to cease. Remittance patterns are consistent with 
an insurance motivation. There exists a strong positive correlation between drought impacting cropping and livestock 
and/or shocks arising through ill health or death in the family and the amount it receives in remittances (Gubert 2002). 
This is only to be expected if one assumes that families send some of their members away to diversify their income and 
get insured against the risks they face. This insurance function has been found to have behavioral implications on 
recipient households. Indeed, as with many forms of insurance, problems of moral hazard seem to be at play. Family 
farms receiving remittances, in spite of having more capital and labor, achieve significantly lower yields than farms that 
do not receive remittances, without this being clearly attributable to differences in soil quality, cropping techniques or 
other factors (Azam and Gubert 2005). On a more positive side, the insurance function of remittances implies that 
recipient households are protected against situations of transitory economic hardship which has been shown to have 
strong detrimental effects on children education and health outcomes.  
Remittances also have spillover effects through local market linkages. In the Kayes area, incomes from abroad 
have significantly increased the local demand for vegetables and fruits as well as the demand for housing construction. 
This has provided strong incentives for non-migrant households to invest in those activities, and many of them, 
especially those located on the Senegal River, now derive a large proportion of their income from vegetable farming. 
Migration and remittances have also contributed to driving up local wages and prices. This inflationary pressure creates 
benefits for wage earners and net suppliers of goods and services but also negatively impacts local consumers.  
Migrant associations abroad also help to improve the living standards of those who stay behind by playing an 
active role in setting up and financing development projects in the villages back home. A recent survey conducted on a 
representative sample of localities in Mali, among which 62 in the Kayes area, registered 159 Home Town Associations 
(HTAs) created by Malians in France and 92 HTAs created by Malians elsewhere for the region (Bernard at al. 2012). 
While their actions were initially confined to prestigious projects such as the construction of mosques, these HTAs have 
gradually expanded to cover every aspect of daily life in the villages with projects ranging from hydraulics to healthcare 
and from basic education to cultural exchanges. More and more projects initiated by migrant associations are now 
 supported by other partners such as non-governmental organizations, twin towns in France, or local associations. In 
addition to financially supporting the construction of village infrastructures, many HTAs also contribute to the operating 
costs of those infrastructures. Their members’ contributions are often used to pay healthcare and teaching staff as well 
as the drugs and vaccines delivered by dispensaries.  
The main criticism leveled by local development operators is that migrant-driven projects are non-productive. 
The few productive investment projects they do finance are generally in urban areas and in sectors most likely to 
generate income (e.g. real estate, transport, or the hotel business). In rural areas, most projects are abandoned before 
they have time to generate any notable spillover effects on village economies. The few projects that are successful are 
those that facilitate the household distribution of consumer goods (e.g. general stores and grain banks) or provide 
support for the purchase of farming equipment. Of the several possible explanations, physical, economic and/or 
institutional environment play key roles. In the Kayes area, particularly poor weather conditions and inadequate or 
inexistent road infrastructure are strong factors that drive small farmers out of agriculture and offer no incentive to 
reinvest migrants’ remittances in the local economy. Owing to the price of goods and inputs, the type of technology 
available and the conditions for market entry, investment does not always appear to be economically efficient.  Migrants 
accordingly prefer projects in areas that are not economically productive, such as those traditionally covered by the 
public sector.  
Accumulated evidence on the investment-oriented initiatives taken by migrants in their home country and their 
insurance function supports the idea that migration has a strong impact on poverty reduction in the Kayes area. 
Moreover, because money sent back home circulates within the region, there is no doubt that migrants in France help 
stabilize hundreds of thousands of individuals residing in the region. However, migrant-driven projects are criticized for 
their low impact on the structural causes of poverty. Though, from a longer-term perspective, putting remittances to 
uses that are not directly productive may strongly impact on the foundations of development such as health, education, 
culture or the environment. 
  
 MIGRATION AND RURAL WELFARE: THE 




In order to examine the impact of continental and intercontinental migration on migrant sending households and study 
the effect of potential policies to limit or expand migration, a farm household model was developed and applied to data 
from a survey of a sample of 223 households drawn from four villages on the Central Plateau of Burkina Faso. These 
villages were selected according to various criteria one of which is the importance of intercontinental migration, 
primarily to Italy, in two of the four villages. Selection of households within the villages was random.  
Households are assumed to maximize a utility function defined on consumption of goods and leisure, subject to 
income and time constraint. Income is derived from agricultural production using land, labor, fertilizer and capital as 
inputs. Labor and other tradable inputs are considered to be endogenous to this production process. Income is also 
result of non-farm activities where output is produced using household labor and human capital variables as inputs and 
the former considered endogenous to the production process. Finally, remittances are a source of income produced by 
allocating household time to intercontinental or continental migration. Time allocation to these two forms of migration 
is estimated as a function of landholdings and networks. A missing market for labor means that households are 
constrained in their allocation of time to these various activities and leisure by their total time endowment. In case of a 
missing market for labor, the shadow wage, say the additional income earned by putting additional time into farm 
activities, is relevant in determining the household’s organization of production and its choices of consumption. The 
shadow full income represents the sum of income from labor used in agriculture, self-employment activities, migration 
and leisure valued at the previously defined shadow wage.  
A benchmark that is useful for analyzing the impact of migration on development is how migration and related 
remittances reshape migrant-sending economies. Three cornerstones of policy that “maximize migration payoffs” have 
been identified namely remittances, recruitment, and return. Remittances could stimulate the local economy by 
enabling households to overcome production and investment constraints. Recruitment deals with the question of who 
migrates. Migration implies a loss of labor to the sending economy and migration “pessimists” often emphasize the 
“Dutch disease” effect according to which the extra income in the form of remittances, combined with the reduction in 
labor force, leads to higher prices for non-tradables and discourages the production of tradable goods. Returns refer to 
the issues of migrant return with new technologies and ideas of use both to them and to their country, or of return to 
retire. Migrants display a certain risk-taking behavior, which when combined with skills and capital acquired elsewhere – 
brain gain – can positively impact on economic development in the source economy.  
Model estimation results suggest for recruitment that continental migrants are likely to originate from poorer 
households, i.e. households with smaller landholdings compared to households without migrants, while intercontinental 
migrants tend to come from wealthier households. For remittances, the destination of a migrant is a strong determinant 
of transfers sent back to the household with remittances from intercontinental migration being much higher compared 
to those from continental migrants. Migrant return cannot be studied here but a positive relationship exists between 
duration of absence and remittances, with migrants that have been absent for longer remitting more, perhaps due to 
them having become more settled in the host region.  
Maximization of the impact of migration on development depends crucially on the implementation of sound 
immigration policies in receiving economies. The agricultural household model described above forms the basis for three 
simulations that explore the impact of different migration policies on the welfare of migrant-sending households. A first 
simulation is a Temporary Migration Program (TMP) for potential migrants from Burkina Faso to Italy. This TMP would 
be designed in such a way as to ensure that migration costs (e.g. travel and recruitment costs) incurred by migrants are 
lower than those incurred when migrating illegally.  Such a TMP is expected to significantly raise the number of migrant 
workers legally admitted and employed in Italy with anticipated positive effects on remittances. The simulation carried 
out here is an increase of the allocation of labor to intercontinental migration by 10 percent. For comparative purposes 
a second simulation involving a 10 percent increase in the allocation of labor to continental migration is also carried out. 
 A third simulation is the granting of legal status expected to increase the duration of absence of the migrant. The 
simulation carried out here is an increase in the duration of absence by 10 percent. 
Simulation results (Table 1) show that outcomes strongly differ for the different migrant destinations. A 10% 
increase in the allocation of labor to continental migration leads to less labor allocated to agricultural and self-
employment activities (lost-labor effect); this reduced allocation of labor leads to an immediate fall in income. In 
response to this income loss, households reduce their consumption of goods and leisure to work more, which tempers 
the income loss but does not offset it. As a consequence, continental migration leads to a reduction in welfare. When 
prices are allowed to adjust, we see that continental migration also increases the shadow wage, which implies that the 
consumption of leisure becomes more expensive. Household members would thus like to work even more in agriculture 
and self-employment activities. However, labor is now more expensive and the household economy cannot absorb this 
extra labor. A higher shadow wage also means that the value of leisure increases, tempering the loss in shadow full 
income. However, even after the adjustment in the shadow wage, a 10 percent increase in labor allocated to continental 
migration would lead to a fall in income.  
When, instead, the allocation of labor to intercontinental migration increases by 10 percent, the picture is 
completely different. The much larger remittances (remittance-effect) compensate for the lost-labor effect, so that 
shadow full income increases despite a loss of labor to migration and more consumption of leisure due to the income 
effect. The shadow wage increases significantly and labor demand in agriculture and self-employment activities falls as a 
consequence. However, leisure consumption also becomes more expensive, leading to an overall increase in shadow full 
income. When 10 percent of labor is relocated from continental to intercontinental migration, the lost-labor effect does 
not arise, but the resulting higher income still implies a reduction in household supply of labor. The shadow wage 
increase is thus significant and demand for labor falls, resulting in less income generated in agriculture and self-
employment activities, tempering the increase in shadow full income.  
A 10 percent increase in duration of absence increases remittances by about 2.1 percent. The household has 
already induced the labor loss so initial production effects do not arise. However, the income increase due to larger 
remittances leads households to consume more of all normal goods including leisure thereby reducing their supply of 
labor to productive activities, agriculture, and self-employment. Less labor allocated to agriculture raises the marginal 
value product of labor and consequently the shadow wage. An increase in the shadow wage implies that the 
consumption of leisure becomes more expensive. Household members would thus like to supply more labor to 
agriculture and self-employment activities. However, demand for labor does not change so that this extra supply cannot 
be absorbed and the value of output falls. Despite the reduction in the value of output from agriculture and self-
employment activities, household welfare improves if the duration of stay abroad of a migrant increases. 
 
 
Table 3- Migration simulations 
 10% increase in 
labor going to 
continental 
migration 
10% increase in 









in the duration 
of absence of a    
migrant  
Production effects      
Agriculture (%) -1.09 -0.02 - - 
Non-farm (%) -1.43 -0.02 - - 
Remittances (%) 4.40 10.70 10.70 2.10 
Consumption effects     
Own food (%) -0.69 0.04 0.06 0.01 
Purchased food (%)  -0.43 0.03 0.04 0.01 
Nonfood (%) -0.60 0.04 0.05 0.01 
Durables (%) -1.02 0.07 0.09 0.02 
Education (%) -0.77 0.05 0.06 0.01 
Leisure (%) -0.87 0.06 0.07 0.01 
Labor supply (%)  0.73 -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 
Shadow full income (%) -0.81 0.05 0.07 0.01 
EV (FCFA) -4 918 321 406 80 
 
Shadow wage effects     
  10% increase in 
labor going to 
continental 
migration 
10% increase in 









in the duration 
of absence of a    
migrant  
Shadow wage (%) 1.00 0.05 0.03 0.01 
Labor supply (%) 2.78 0.14 0.09 0.02 
Labor demand (%) -0.47 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 
Shadow full income (%) -0.43 0.07 0.07 0.01 
EV with shadow wage change (FCFA) -2 638 444 426 84 
Source: Author Calculations. 
 
These simulation results show that, in contrast to continental migration, welfare effects of increased household 
engagement in intercontinental migration, both in terms of more migration and a longer duration of absence, are 
substantial. However, it needs to be borne in mind that although household welfare improves, a missing market for 
labor means that labor-intensive productive activities are crowded out in the short-run. In terms of policy implications, 
results of these simulations thus lend support to the introduction of a Temporary Migration Program (TMP) which, in 
addition to facilitating migration control in host economies, would, by allowing for increased engagement in 
intercontinental migration, improve the welfare of migrant sending households. The temporary nature of such a 
program would ensure that “Dutch disease” effects, where migration increases the price of tradeable good (labor) and 
crowds out local labor-intensive activities would be mitigated through eventual migrant return. Granting of legal status 
to migrants already abroad by means of a temporary work and residence permit is also recommended if the objective is 
to improve the welfare of migrant-sending households. Legalization of these migrants is expected to prolong their stay 
abroad, thereby increasing remittances while avoiding a new loss of labor and thus entailing a significant improvement 





 THE MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT PENDULUM: A 
CRITICAL VIEW ON RESEARCH AND POLICY 
Hein de Haas 
Empirical evidence supports the view that migration in and from developing countries is often a rather deliberate 
attempt by migrants and their families to spread income risks and to improve livelihoods. Migration is often considered 
a livelihood strategy and a household investment to improve its long term social and economic status. Internal and 
international migration can have a crucial insurance function by protecting people from the destabilizing and 
exclusionary effects of absent or ill-functioning markets, inequality, corruption and authoritarianism, failing state 
policies, and a lack of state-provided social security and basic public services such as education and health care.. 
Spending and investment of remittances can also have substantial positive effects on economic growth in origin 
communities and regions, from which (poorer) non-migrants can also benefit to a certain extent through ‘multiplier’ 
effects. From a perspective of human development that focuses on the well-being and capabilities of people, this 
constitutes progress and should be seen in a positive light.  
However, migration and remittances cannot overcome more structural development constraints such as 
misguided macroeconomic policies, socioeconomic inequalities, authoritarianism, corruption, and legal insecurity.  
Evidence shows that the extent to which migration can play a positive (or negative) role in social, economic and political 
change in origin-countries depends on broad development conditions. In contexts that are unfavorable to human and 
social development, migration may actually reinforce existing inequalities. High poverty and inequality often mean that 
international migration (particularly to wealthy countries) remains a privilege of the more affluent groups in origin 
communities and societies. Such strong ‘‘selection’’ is reinforced by immigration policies that discriminate in favor of the 
skilled and against the low-skilled.  
On a global level, available remittance data suggest that international remittances may sustain international 
inequalities particularly regarding the gap between low- and middle income countries. Figure 3 shows that remittances 
are particularly significant for the group of lower-middle-income countries, while for the group of low-income countries, 
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) is still the most valuable resource flow. If we express remittances as a 
percentage of total GDP (Figure 4), a somewhat different picture emerges. While the majority of global remittances goes 
to middle-income countries, the poorest countries have a relatively high dependency on remittances. In fact, their 
remittance dependency has increased from around 2 percent of total GDP in the mid-1990s to over 6.5 percent in 2008. 
Although it is difficult to distill definitive causal links from this descriptive analysis, the data seems to suggest that high 
remittance-dependency is a feature of structurally weak economies rather than a characteristic of growing, diversifying, 
and strong economies. 
 
  
 Figure 3 - Remittances, foreign direct investment and aid flows to developing countries (2008) 
 
 
Source: World Bank 2009. 
 
 
Figure 4 – Remittances as a percentage of GDP, 1982-2009 
 
 
Source: World Bank 2009. 
 
 
In conclusion, although migrants can potentially accelerate development at home, they can neither be blamed for a lack 
of development nor be expected to generate development in unattractive investment environments. Migration alone 
cannot independently set in motion broader processes of human and economic development. The right question is not 
whether migration leads to certain types of development, but how differences in migration policy and investment 
environments explain why migration plays a positive development role in some cases and less positive or even a 
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